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Reversing the Keynesian Asymmetry 
 
By John Bennett and Manfredi M.A. La Manna* 
 
The assumption that nominal price adjustment is costly for firms (there are “menu costs”) 
has generated a stream of important theoretical papers over the last decade or so.1 In so far as this 
literature generates asymmetric adjustments, it provides a theoretical underpinning for the (old) 
Keynesian assumption that nominal prices are more flexible upward than downward.2 Yet, the 
empirical evidence, while confirming that asymmetries exist, does not indicate the dominance of 
any particular form of asymmetry (see Dennis W. Carlton, 1986; Alan S. Blinder, 1991). In this 
paper we argue that the gap between theory and practice may be the result of the focus of menu-
cost models on specific forms of market structure. Existing menu-cost models are based on the 
assumption of relatively uncompetitive market structures – monopoly, oligopoly, or monopolistic 
competition with a fixed number of firms. We widen the scope of the analysis by examining 
what we call a quasi-competitive industry and demonstrate that it displays a pattern of 
adjustment quite different from that found in other models. The Keynesian asymmetry is 
reversed, with nominal price being more flexible downward than upward.3 We suggest therefore 
that a relationship exists between market structure and the pattern of nominal price adjustment. 
Since there is presumably a variety of market structures, this may help explain the inconclusive 
empirical evidence. 
We model the most competitive market configuration compatible with menu costs: 
Bertrand oligopoly in a dynamic setting with free entry. It is assumed that (a) an incumbent in 
one period can continue to sell at its existing nominal price in the next period without incurring 
any additional menu cost, whereas an entrant would have to incur a menu cost; and (b) among 
the firms willing to sell at the lowest price in any given period, one is chosen randomly to sell the 
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product. These simplifications enable us to abstract from matters – such as determining the 
identity of active firms – extraneous to our main concern of establishing a clean connection 
between market structure and the pattern of price (in)flexibility.  4  
To set a benchmark and to obtain a simple solution by backward induction, we begin by 
assuming a two-period time-horizon. Then we extend the analysis to the case where the 
incumbent faces an ever-recurring threat of entry, that is, with an infinite horizon.5 This is the 
scenario we call “quasi-competitive”. Comparing these two extreme cases yields an intuitively 
appealing relationship between competitiveness and the pattern of nominal price adjustment. 
Whereas the two-period model produces some inflexibility in either direction, the increased 
competitiveness generated by the infinite horizon reverses the Keynesian asymmetry. 
Furthermore, the two-period case may be of independent interest, for it highlights a somewhat 
paradoxical result concerning the interpretation of price observations. We show that the 
observation of a small reduction in nominal price need not be taken as evidence that nominal 
price is flexible downward with respect to a reduction in a nominal scale variable. 
Section I sets out the model, while Section II examines the solution. Section III places the 
model in the context of some related literature, and Section IV concludes. Proofs are relegated to 
the appendix. 
I. The Model 
Time is modeled in discrete periods, indexed by the subscript  t = 1, 2, ...6  Let N be a nominal 
variable (e.g., a cost-of-living index) subject to random shocks. Denote its realized value for 
period t by Nt , which is publicly observed at the start of the period. Realizations are independent 
draws from a probability distribution )N(y  defined over the compact support ][ N,N . We do 
not impose any restriction on )N(y  other than it being atomless. At the start of period 1 J risk-
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neutral firms )2J( ³  become capable of supplying a new non-storable homogeneous good (or 
service).7 In order to produce, any firm has to incur two types of cost: (a) a nominal menu cost 
mNt (m in real terms); and (b) a constant marginal production cost Nt in nominal terms (unity in 
real terms). 8 
Upon observing Nt , each firm j  (j = 1,..., J) simultaneously makes a bid to supply the product 
in period t. We denote firm j’s nominal price bid by jtP , the corresponding real price being 
t
j
t
j
t N/Pp º . Firms engage in Bertrand competition, but for any period t only one of the k 
)Jk1( ££  firms bidding the lowest price is chosen randomly to supply the good. This 
simplification may represent a situation where there exists some (small) exogenous asymmetry 
that allows a lowest-price firm to incur the menu cost before the others. Alternatively, the 
assumption fits the scenario of a central purchasing agency, where demand originates from 
decentralized units of a larger organisation, such as divisions of an M-form corporation or 
schools and hospitals operating under a local government agency. In these circumstances, it is 
common for the agency to select one supplier and let individual units order from the chosen firm 
according to their requirements (Peter J.H. Baily, 1987). Such contracts are generic, in that the 
chosen supplier provides the full menu only after agreeing terms with the agency.  9 
Throughout, we regard any firm that bids a new nominal price in period t + 1 (different from 
the nominal price ruling at t) as a potential entrant in period t + 1 – even if the firm concerned 
was the incumbent in period t. Also, if, for period t+1, the incumbent from period t offers to 
continue supplying at its period-t nominal price, we regard this as a bid like any other. Exit is 
assumed to be costless in the sense that if a firm becomes the incumbent (prints a new menu) in 
one period, it is under no obligation to supply the market in any subsequent period.10 Let 
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}P{minP jt
j
t º be the lowest nominal price bid in period t, the corresponding real price being 
}p{minp jt
j
t º . The time-invariant market demand for the product in period t is )p(D t , where 
0dp/)(dD t <×  and there exist values of tp  such that 0)p(D t > .
11,12 The strong contestability 
flavor of our assumptions is summarized in 
ASSUMPTION 1: (i) if k )Jk1( ££  firms are willing to supply at the lowest nominal price 
)terms real in p(P tt , then only one is selected (with prob. 1/k) to supply the 
entire demand )p(D t ; (ii) the menu cost is incurred only by the selected 
supplier (that is, after all price bids are revealed); (iii) at time t + 1, trade by 
the period-t incumbent is voluntary. 
Thus the demand function facing any firm j in period t  is 
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where jtp
-  is the vector of price bids in real terms for period t by firms other than j, and k is the 
number of lowest-bid firms.13  
We define )p( tp  as the real gross profit (i.e., excluding any menu cost) earned by the sole 
supplier at time t : 
(2)  ]1p)[p(D)p( ttt -=p .  
Subtracting the real menu cost gives real net profit, m)p( t -ð . We define tpˆ  by 
(3) 0m)pˆ( t º-ð ,  
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with tPˆ  being the corresponding nominal price. 
Let )p(argmaxp t
mon ðº  denote the (unique) monopoly real price. Because of 
competitive bidding (see Assumption 1) no newly-set price can exceed monp . Therefore we 
restrict our analysis throughout to ]p,0[p mont Î  without loss of generality. We make the 
standard assumption 
(4) 0dp/)p(d tt >ð . 
From (2)-(4) we obtain14  
(5) 0dN/)p(d tt <ð ,  .0dN/Pˆd tt >  
II. The solution 
We now solve for the equilibrium nominal price vector, given that each firm’s objective is to 
maximize the expected present value of its real net profit stream. Consider first a two-period 
world. For any pair of realized N, }N,N{ 21 , let }P,P{
*
2
*
1  be the pair of equilibrium nominal 
prices, and }p,p{ *2*1  the corresponding pair of real prices. 
PROPOSITION 1 (two-period case):  
 
(i) 1
*
11 PˆPN << . 
(ii) 
ïïî
ïï
í
ì
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Î
Î>
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2  
where 2Nˆ  is defined by  
(6)  m)Nˆ/P( 2
*
1 =p . 
 
Proof: see the appendix. 
To see the intuition of this proposition, consider first period 2. As exit is costless, there are 
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only two potential equilibrium nominal prices for the one-shot Bertrand game played in this 
period: (a) a new menu is printed and a new nominal price charged which, because of the force 
of Bertrand competition, must be the break-even nominal price: 2
*
2 PˆP = ; or (b) the incumbent 
can retain its period-1 nominal price, *1
*
2 PP = , without being undercut, thereby enjoying a 
positive real net profit.15 Thus, in period 2 the incumbent either exits costlessly or makes a 
positive real net profit. Hence, as Bertrand competition requires the present value of the 
incumbent’s expected real net profits over the two periods to be zero, the equilibrium nominal 
price in period 1 must yield a negative real net profit, that is, 1
*
1 PˆP < . In the appendix we show 
that the incumbent must make a positive real gross profit in period 1, that is, 1
*
1 NP > , otherwise 
the period-1 loss could never be recouped in period 2. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the equilibrium nominal price in period 2, *2P , adjusts to the period-2 
realizations of the nominal scale variable, 2N , for any arbitrary 1N , taking into account, as we 
have just indicated, that 1
*
11 PˆPN << .  
Consider a realization ]N,P(N *12 Î . By retaining *1P  the incumbent would earn a 
negative real net profit )NP)(N/P(D 2
*
12
*
1 - , so it prefers to exit. The entrant’s equilibrium 
nominal price *2P  will allow it to break even: 
*
112
*
2 PPˆPˆP >>= , where the inequality follows 
from (5), given that 12 NN > . For 2N  ranging from *1P  to N , *2P  lies on the DE segment in 
Figure 1.  
Consider next a realization ]P,Nˆ[N *122 Î . At 
*
12 PN =  the incumbent is indifferent 
between exiting and continuing to sell at *1P . Realizations of 2N  lower than 
*
1P  would earn 
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positive real net profit from continued incumbency; but if 2N  is sufficiently small, an entrant 
can both match *1P  and cover its menu cost. This happens at 22 NˆN = , where 
22
*
12
*
1 Nˆm)NˆP)(Nˆ/P(D =- .
16 Therefore for ]P,Nˆ[N *122 Î , the equilibrium nominal price 
in period 2 lies on BC in Figure 1.  
Finally, for realizations )Nˆ,N[N 22 Î , the incumbent is undercut by a breaking-even entrant 
setting *12
*
2 PPˆP <=  (segment AB applies). 
B’ 
*
2P
D 
C 
B 
A
N1Pˆ
*
1P1N2NˆN
E 
2N
 
Figure 1 
Thus, in the two-period case, Bertrand competition yields a two-sided (s, S) optimal nominal 
price adjustment rule. Note, however, a distinctive feature of adjustment in this case. Even 
though, as indicated by the segment BB’, there is downward inflexibility of nominal price with 
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respect to N for all realizations )N,Nˆ[N 122 Î , it can be seen from Figure 1 that 
*
2P  may fall 
below *1P  by an arbitrarily small amount. This suggests that the magnitude of nominal price 
reductions observed in practice may be a misleading indicator of nominal price (in)flexibility 
with respect to the nominal scale variable. 
When we extend the analysis to a quasi-competitive industry with nominal prices set under an 
infinite horizon, we find that nominal prices are perfectly flexible downward. This result is 
formalised in the following proposition, where, for simplicity, we focus on the adjustment (if 
any) of nominal price in period 2: 
PROPOSITION 2 (reversal of the Keynesian asymmetry under an infinite horizon): 
(i) 1
*
11 PˆPN << ; 
(ii) 
ïïî
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Proof: See the appendix. 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is similar to that for Proposition 1, with two major 
differences. First, an entrant in period 2 is no longer required to set a nominal price that yields 
zero real net profit in that period. Indeed, the equilibrium nominal price for an entrant will have 
to be such that it yields a zero expected value of the stream of real net profits over the infinite 
horizon, irrespective of the period of entry.17 Second, because of the infinite horizon, in the event 
of 2N  falling short of 1N  by however small an amount, the incumbent can no longer retain the 
nominal price from the previous period without being undercut. In fact, an entrant in period 2 
would face exactly the same prospects the incumbent had faced in period 1, except that now the 
entrant enjoys a lower realization of N, and therefore can achieve a zero present value of the 
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stream of real net profits by setting a nominal price lower than *1P . This is the source of the 
downward nominal price flexibility. In the event of a realization 2N  above 1N , similar logic 
yields the conclusion that, because of the higher nominal menu cost, *1P  cannot be undercut. 
However, if *22 PN >  the incumbent’s real net profit )NP)(N/P(D 2
*
12
*
1 -  from continuing to 
sell at *1P  would become negative. 
The pattern of (nominal) price (in)flexibility that we have established for the first two 
realizations of N in the infinite-horizon case applies generally: *tP  will be supplanted at the first 
realization of N falling outside ]P,N[ *tt . Immediately following the period when a new 
nominal price is set, there is full downward flexibility, but partial upward flexibility. However, if 
N takes a value in the interior of ]P,N[ *tt , a further marginal change in either direction has no 
effect on nominal price, while if the value of N reaches the upper bound *tP , a further small rise 
in N will be accompanied by a nominal price rise. Hence, the model is consistent with a variety 
of observations of nominal price adjustment and inflexibility. The critical difference between the 
two-period and the infinite-horizon cases is that in the latter the lower bound of the range of 
realizations of 2N  for which nominal price is unchanged turns out to be 1N  (as opposed to 
12 NNˆ <  in the two-period case), so that any negative shock immediately following an 
adjustment in nominal price will always result in a lower nominal price. Therefore, under an 
infinite horizon, we obtain the reverse of the Keynesian asymmetry. In terms of Figure 1, the 
general shape of the adjustment curve survives, except that now it slopes downward not to the 
left of point B, but to the left of point B’, as shown by the broken curve AB’. 
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III. Some related literature 
The model can be linked to several strands of the literature on nominal price adjustment. The 
contribution most closely related to ours is that by Julio Rotemberg and Garth Saloner (1987), 
who compare the nominal price adjustment, in the presence of menu costs, of a monopolist with 
that of duopolists. When a nominal scale variable is perturbed, they find some inflexibility, both 
upward and downward, in each market structure, but with greater inflexibility for the monopolist. 
Thus, they relate the extent of nominal price adjustment to market structure. Our contribution 
extends their logic, by showing that not only the extent, but also the form, of adjustment may 
change with market structure.  
Secondly, there is a literature focusing on the labor market that argues that workers resist 
nominal wage cuts and so, if mark-ups are not too countercyclical, nominal prices tend to be 
inflexible downward. The contribution by Christopher Hanes (1993) is particularly pertinent 
here. In his analysis firms recognize that a nominal wage cut may result in a costly strike. In the 
case of an imperfectly competitive industry, the cost associated with the latter may offset the 
benefits of setting a lower nominal wage. In contrast, a competitive industry cannot sustain 
nominal wage (and price) rigidity as a Nash equilibrium, as each firm would have an incentive to 
deviate. Hanes attributes the increase in nominal rigidity in the United States in the late 19th 
century to the rise of imperfect competition. There is a broad parallel with our model, in so far as 
the costs associated with strike action may be regarded as the menu cost of setting a lower 
nominal wage. Given the existence of such costs in Hanes’s analysis, downward nominal rigidity 
only obtains when markets are imperfectly competitive, a result similar to that implied by our 
model. 
Thirdly, there is the empirical evidence on the effects of monetary shocks. Using primarily 
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US data, various studies (for example, James Cover, 1992) have found that negative monetary 
shocks have a greater effect on output than positive ones. Several theoretical explanations have 
been suggested for this finding (see Magda Kandil, 1996), one being that it results from the 
Keynesian asymmetry. However, more recent work casts doubt on the robustness of Cover’s 
results. Morten Ravn and Martin Sola (1996) find that, once the 1979 regime shift in monetary 
policy is allowed for, positive and negative shock have symmetric effects, a conclusion that is 
supported by Charles Weise (1999).18 In conjunction with the micro data referred to above, 
which identify various patterns of asymmetric adjustments with no one type being prevalent, 
these recent findings highlighting a lack of asymmetry at the aggregate level are consistent with 
our general hypothesis that the pattern of nominal price adjustment depends on the market 
structures of the industries concerned. 
IV. Conclusion 
Although our analysis is intended as a depiction of one of the many forms that market 
competition may take, rather than to have general validity, we believe that, when combined with 
existing menu-cost formulations, it makes rather forcibly the point that the pattern of nominal 
price (in)flexibility induced by the presence of menu costs depends crucially on the type of 
competition assumed in the relevant markets. The fact that the Keynesian asymmetry does not 
appear in the two-period case, but is reversed in the more fiercely competitive infinite-horizon 
case, reinforces our conclusion. 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. 
We start from period 2. For any given *1P , either 
*
2P 2Pˆ= , where 
22222 Nm)NPˆ)(N/Pˆ(D =- , if price is adjusted, or 
*
1
*
2 PP = , if it is not. 
(i) To prove that 1
*
1 PˆP < , suppose to the contrary that 1
*
1 PˆP =  (the argument holds a fortiori 
if 1
*
1 PˆP > ). For this to be a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, the incumbent must make no positive 
expected net profit in period 2. Consider a realization e+= 12 NN , with e  positive and “small”. 
Using (4), m)N/Pˆ()N/Pˆ( 1121 =< pp , that is, no entrant could match (and a fortiori undercut) 
the incumbent’s nominal price without incurring a real net loss. As )( ×p  is continuous in 1P , an 
appropriate e  can be found such that 0)N/Pˆ( 21 >p , so that the incumbent can maintain its 
period-1 price and still make a positive real net profit. To prove that *11 PN < , suppose that 
*
11 PN ³ , so that the incumbent not only would not be able to cover its menu cost but would 
make an additional real loss 0)1N/P)(N/P(D 1
*
11
*
1 £- . This additional loss can never be 
recouped in period 2, where the maximum net real profit can be equal at most to the real menu 
cost m.  
(ii): Two conditions must be satisfied for nominal price not  to be adjusted in period 2: (a) by 
retaining its period-1 nominal price, the incumbent makes a non-negative real gross profit, and 
(b) no entrant can undercut period-1 nominal price and make a non-negative net profit. Using 
(4), 12 NNˆ < , where 2Nˆ  is defined by (6), and thus for any negative shock )N,Nˆ[N 122 Î  no 
nominal price adjustment takes place. The largest positive shock that the incumbent would be 
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able to absorb without incurring a loss is determined by 0)NP)(N/P(D 2
*
12
*
1 =- . This upper 
bound is *1P .  
*
1P  is determined by the condition that the real net loss incurred in period 1 is offset by the 
discounted expected real net profit generated by nominal price rigidity in period 2, namely ,  
(A1) 22
P
Nˆ 2
*
1
2
*
1
1
*
1
1
*
1 dN)N()1
N
P
)(
N
P
(D)1
N
P
)(
N
P
(Dm
*
1
2
yd ò -=-- . 
where 1£d  is the discount factor.19 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. 
Suppose firm f becomes the supplier for period t. Let )N/P(V tt
f  denote the expected 
present value of f ’s real net profit stream from period t onwards, net of real menu cost m , when 
it prints a menu with nominal price tP : 
(A2) ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
--úû
ù
êë
é= å ò
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+ )
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where Lt  and Ut are respectively the greatest lower and least upper bounds of the range of 
realizations of N for which the incumbent of period t can retain the previous period’s nominal 
price, earn non-negative profits and not be undercut.20 
Let *1P  denote the lowest nominal price at which 0)U,L;N/P(V 1111
f = . Proposition 2(i) 
states that the equilibrium price *1P  is such that in period 1 the price-setter makes a positive real 
gross profit (that is, *11 PN < ) and a negative real net loss ( 1
*
1 PˆP < ).   
(a) *11 PN < . Suppose to the contrary that 
*
11 PN ³ . This implies that the non-positive real 
gross profit accruing in period 1 must be offset by strictly positive expected real net profits 
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earned from period 2 onwards, that is, there must exist a range of realizations )P,Nˆ[ *12  such 
that  
(A3) 0)P,Nˆ;N/P(V *121
*
1
f =  
To prove that no such range exists it suffices to show that for any )P,Nˆ[N *122 Î , 
0)P,Nˆ;N/P(V *122
*
1 > , so that undercutting by an entrant is both feasible and profitable. Using 
(A3) and (4) we obtain 
(A4)  0)N/P()N/P()P,Nˆ;N/P(V 1
*
12
*
1
*
122
*
1 >-= pp .  
(b) 1
*
1 PˆP < . It cannot be the case that 1
*
1 PˆP > , because there can be no profitable hit-and-run 
entry in equilibrium. The remaining possibility 1
*
1 PˆP =  is ruled out by the fact that for all 
realizations of 2N  such that 121 PˆNN <<  firm f  would make a strictly positive real net profit 
and could not be undercut, thereby implying that  0)P,N;N/P(V *111
*
1 >  – a contradiction. 
(ii). *1P  is the smallest solution of the equation 0)U,L;N/P(V 1111 = , that is 
(A5) [ ] )N/P(sdN)N()N/P(m s*1
2s
U
L
1s
1
*
1
1
1
ðøäð å ò
¥
=
+=-   
The l.h.s. of (A5) is the real net loss incurred at 1t = , whereas the r.h.s. of (A5) is the expected 
present value of the real net profit stream for ¥= ,,2t K , conditional on consecutive realizations 
of N falling within the range where nominal price is kept unchanged, that is, [ 11 U,L ]. We have 
already shown in Proposition 2(i) that charging *1P  yields a real net loss in period 1 that has to be 
offset by retaining *1P  as the ruling nominal price in period 2 for some realizations of N.  All that 
remains to prove Proposition 2(ii) is to show that 11 NL =  and 
*
11 PU = : 
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(a) 11 NL = . If 12 NN < , then at t = 2 the incumbent would be undercut, since other firms 
would face lower nominal costs than at t = 1 and thus the lowest nominal price such that   
0)U,L;N/P(V 2222 =  would be strictly less than *1P . If 12 NN =  the equilibrium price would 
stay unchanged. Therefore, 11 NL =   . 
(b) *11 PU = . For 12 NN > , no firm would find it profitable to undercut *1P . Thus 1U  is the 
realization of N at which the incumbent is indifferent between retaining *1P  and making a new 
bid, which is *1P  itself.  
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Footnotes 
 
* BENNETT: Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, 
UK, UB8 3PH; LA MANNA: Department of Economics, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, 
Scotland, UK, KY16 9AL. This work developed out of earlier discussions with Subhashish 
Gupta. We are also grateful to V. Bhaskar, Huw Dixon, Elisabetta Iossa, Jonathan Thomas, and 
anonymous referees for very helpful comments. 
1 For surveys, see N. Gregory Mankiw and David Romer (1991), Torben M. Andersen (1994) 
and Huw D. Dixon and Neil Rankin (1994). 
2 Models providing some support for the Keynesian asymmetry include Daniel Tsiddon (1993) 
and Laurence Ball and N. Gregory Mankiw (1994). However, Robert J Barro (1972) and N. 
Gregory Mankiw (1985), among others, produce two-directional stickiness. The Tsiddon and 
Ball-Mankiw models are based on the assumption of positive trend inflation, whereby a firm that 
wishes to reduce its relative price finds that it can do so costlessly merely by keeping its nominal 
price unchanged. Conversely, a firm that wishes to raise its relative price finds that inflation 
widens the gap between its desired and actual nominal price, thereby providing a strong 
incentive to incur a menu cost and raise its nominal price 
3 A similar pattern of greater downward flexibility is found in kinked-demand-curve models, but 
there it occurs essentially by assumption; see, for example, Jean Tirole (1988, pp. 243-44).  
4 A Bertrand duopoly model that yields the Keynesian asymmetry can be found in Per Svejstrup 
Hansen et al. (1996). Although their model and ours are not directly comparable (in so far as 
they consider real shocks and produce asymmetric price adjustments in the absence of menu 
costs), we conjecture that the opposite asymmetry generated by our model is due to our key 
assumption of free entry. 
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5 To establish the basic message of the paper it is not necessary to examine the more complicated 
case of a T-period model, where .2T >>¥  
6 Where appropriate, we specify whether the model is of the two-period or of the infinite-horizon 
variety. 
7 If J=1 in our model nominal price adjusts in a manner similar to that found by Robert J. Barro 
(1972). 
8 The assumption of constant marginal cost merely simplifies the exposition, as our results would 
still hold if marginal cost were increasing (see footnote 14). 
9 As the product is assumed to be homogeneous, no benefits would flow from a long-term 
relationship and the agency always has the incentive to switch to a lower-price supplier. For 
example, in the UK, recurrent procurements of homogeneous goods for the National Health 
Service (amounting to about $1bn p.a.) are handled by the NHS Supply Agency on the basis of 
six-month contracts. 
10 Conversely, we assume that a menu printed in period t kills all older menus, that is, once a 
menu printed at t has been superseded by another menu in period t + s, it cannot be costlessly 
resurrected in later periods. 
11 The demand function is defined in terms of real prices only for simplicity. For more general 
demand functions of the form )N,P(D tt  we can identify simple conditions under which the 
main results apply (see footnote 14). 
12 Our results also apply with the more general demand function D(P, N) if either (i) the elasticity 
of demand w.r.t. the nominal variable N weighted by the mark-up rate is less than unity (or, 
equivalently, menu costs are “small” compared to turnover);  or (ii) the elasticity of demand 
w.r.t. changes in the nominal variable does not exceed the price elasticity of demand for output. 
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13 Because firms are identical, except that one is incumbent in any period t, either k = J or k = 1. 
14 As long as (4) is satisfied, our results still hold if marginal cost is not constant. Let the average 
real cost of production be )]p(D[c t , where 0cD ³ , so that )]}p(D[cp){p(D)p( tttt -=ð . 
Therefore, }.Dc1){(D)]}(D[cp{Ddp/)(d pDtpt -×+×-=×ð  Hence, if (4) holds for 0cD = , 
it holds a fortiori for 0cD > . It is immaterial whether the reason for )(c ×  increasing is that there 
are diminishing returns in the production function or because the supply price of an input is 
increasing. Assumption 1, by guaranteeing that at any one time in equilibrium only one firm 
produces positive output, eliminates some of the potential complications associated with 
increasing marginal cost. The multiple-equilibria problem that plagues Bertrand competition is 
avoided (see Xavier Vives (1999), pp. 118-23); and the interdependence among firms’ cost 
functions due to an increasing supply price of an input is absent by construction.  
15 Strictly speaking, the incumbent would earn non-negative real net profit because, for the single 
realization *22 PN = , real net profit would be zero (in this case we have assumed in Proposition 1 
that the incumbent prefers retaining *1P  to exiting). 
16 Notice that 12 NNˆ < . Suppose to the contrary that 12 NNˆ ³ ; then, by (5) *112 PPˆPˆ >³  
and so no entrant could both break even and match *1P . 
17 The condition specified in part (i) of the propositions – that in period 1 real net (gross) profits 
be negative (positive) – now applies not only to the first incumbent, but also to entrants in any 
period, that is, .tPˆP t
*
t "<  
18 None the less, Weise confirms the result first obtained by Rene Garcia and Huntley Schaller 
(1995) that monetary policy changes have a stronger effect on output growth during recessions 
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than during booms. 
19 As formulated, Proposition 1 assumes that 2NˆN £  and NP*1 £ , otherwise and somewhat 
trivially nominal price adjustment will be asymmetric by construction. In fact, if NP*1 > , then 
]N,Nˆ[NPP 22,
*
1
*
2 Î"=  and )Nˆ,N[NPPˆP 22,
*
12
*
2 Î"<= . Similarly, if NNˆ2 < , then  
]N,P(NPPˆP *12,
*
12
*
2 Î">=  and ]P,N[NPP
*
12,
*
1
*
2 Î"= . 
20 Notice that the probability that NS falls within this range is raised to the power s to take into 
account consecutive draws in ]U,L[ tt . 
 
 
 
